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Abstract.
Background: The onset and progression of dementia can result in changes in the subjective experience of self, impacting on
psychological health.
Objective: We aimed to explore the extent to which people with mild-to-moderate dementia experience discontinuity in
the subjective experience of self, and the factors associated with this experience for people with dementia and their family
caregivers.
Methods: We used data from the baseline assessment of the IDEAL cohort. Discontinuity in the subjective experience of
self was assessed by asking participants about their agreement with the statement ‘I feel I am the same person that I have
always been’. Participants were divided into those who did and did not experience discontinuity, and the two groups were
compared in terms of demographic and disease-related characteristics, psychological well-being, measures of ‘living well’,
and caregiver stress.
Results: Responses to the continuity question were available for 1,465 participants with dementia, of whom 312 (21%)
reported experiencing discontinuity. The discontinuity group experienced significantly poorer psychological well-being and
had significantly lower scores on measures of ‘living well’. There was no clear association with demographic or disease-related
characteristics, but some indication of increased caregiver stress.
Conclusion: A significant proportion of people with mild-to-moderate dementia describe experiencing discontinuity in the
subjective sense of self, and this is associated with poorer psychological health and reduced ability to ‘live well’ with the
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condition. Sensitively asking individuals with dementia about the subjective experience of self may offer a simple means of
identifying individuals who are at increased risk of poor well-being.
Keywords: Epistemological self, identity, ontological self, quality of life, satisfaction with life, self-persistence
INTRODUCTION
Good psychological health crucially underpins
positive evaluations of quality of life, well-being,
and satisfaction with life among people with mild-
to-moderate dementia [1]. There are many facets
to psychological health, including positive self-
evaluations and a positive outlook on life, all
reflecting subjective personal experience. Hence, the
subjective experience of self and personal identity
potentially offers a unifying construct that may help
to link these facets together. The onset and pro-
gression of dementia might result in changes in the
experience of self and identity, and impact on psy-
chological health.
Self and identity are difficult concepts to define
precisely, and many different approaches have been
taken to their measurement, often reflecting different
underlying concepts. Models building on the basic
distinction between consciousness (where attention is
directed outwards) and self-awareness (where atten-
tion is directed inwards) offer potential frameworks
for understanding the complex phenomenon of self
[2]. For example, Neisser’s model [3] proposes five
interrelated components of self: ecological, interper-
sonal, extended, private, and conceptual. Focusing
specifically on self and identity among people with
dementia, Sabat’s tripartite model [4, 5] consid-
ers three components: personal identity, beliefs and
attributes, and the personae presented in social inter-
actions. Developing dementia has been considered
as a threat to selfhood and identity [6] due to the
resulting biographical disruption, which is especially
evident in young-onset dementia [7, 8], and the
impact on roles and relationships [9], as well as the
characteristic impairments in cognition, especially
memory, which could crucially affect the experience
of self.
Recent work has attempted to reconcile con-
ceptual frameworks and provide clear avenues for
empirical investigation. Klein [10] focuses on the
distinction between the epistemological or concep-
tual self (the ‘me-self’) and the ontological self
(the ‘I-self’); the former captures the content of,
or mental representation of, the self and the lat-
ter the phenomenological experience of selfhood.
The epistemological or conceptual self is composed
of multiple types of self-knowledge that underpin
our sense of identity, which can be operationalized
and objectively measured. These include, for exam-
ple, knowledge of one’s personality traits or past
life history [3, 11]. The ontological self is the sub-
jective experience of self, which can be described
but which is not easy to measure or quantify [10]
and which has been examined directly in only a
few research studies [12]. Prebble and colleagues
[12] add a temporal dimension to this formula-
tion, distinguishing between the present self and the
temporally-extended self. Various mental processes
enable individuals to integrate diverse aspects of and
information relating to the self and experience a
coherent sense of identity at any given time, termed
‘synchronic unity’. This sense of continuity extends
over time; complex mental processes enable indi-
viduals to experience continuity over time, termed
‘diachronic unity’, in both the subjective sense of self
(phenomenological continuity) and the self-concept
or mental representation of self (semantic continuity).
Lifespan developmental research provides consis-
tent evidence that diachronic unity increases with
age [13–15]. Typically, people feel that, as they age,
they remain the same person, despite experiencing
many changes and developments during the course
of their lives. In a study examining this phenomenon
in healthy individuals aged 85 or over [16], almost
all of these older participants considered themselves
essentially the same person as they had been in their
20s.
As mental processes are crucially involved, the
onset of cognitive impairment may challenge a sense
of continuity of self. Episodic and semantic auto-
biographical memory underpin the conceptual self
through maintenance of self-knowledge structures
and the ability to generate life story narratives.
Episodic memories also contribute to a sense of
the persistence of self over time through the ability
to relive the past and imagine the future (men-
tal time travel) [12, 15]. Impairments in episodic
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memory or in semantic autobiographical memory
could therefore be expected to undermine both
phenomenological and semantic continuity [12]. In
general, however, semantic continuity appears rel-
atively robust in the face of cognitive impairment;
this can be explained by the observation that the
epistemological self is underpinned by multiple,
functionally-independent sources of self-knowledge
[10], so that impairment or attenuation in some
areas is insufficient to affect the overall experi-
ence. With regard to dementia, a comprehensive
review [9] concluded that the epistemological self is
largely maintained in people with mild-to-moderate
dementia. Although aspects of episodic and autobio-
graphical memory are affected, resulting for example
in less temporal coherence within generated life nar-
ratives [17], there are few differences in measures of
the epistemological self between people with mild-to-
moderate dementia and age-matched healthy controls
[18], little change in measures of the epistemologi-
cal self over a 20 month follow-up period [19] and
no linear relationship between decline in cognitive
functioning and deterioration in the epistemological
self over time [20].
Even though the epistemological self remains rel-
atively unaffected, phenomenological continuity in
the ontological self can be affected by the onset
of cognitive impairment, and this in turn can be
linked to poorer well-being [10]. Evidence about the
phenomenological experience of self in people with
dementia is limited. Qualitative research indicates
that while many individuals feel they are still the same
person despite the challenges of living with demen-
tia and the losses involved, others feel that dementia
has affected them and their lives to the extent that
they are not the same person as before [21]. There has
been one in-depth investigation of diachronic unity in
a small sample of 14 people with mild-to-moderate
Alzheimer’s disease [17], using self-persistence and
life-story interviews. The self-persistence interview
began with the question ‘Do you feel that you are
the same person now as you were when you were in
your 20s?’ taken from a previous study of diachronic
unity among older people [16]; responses from the
participants with Alzheimer’s disease were equally
divided between ‘yes’ and ‘no’. However, this ques-
tion invites comparison with a much earlier life-stage
rather than with the pre-dementia experience of self.
Furthermore, that study was not designed to exam-
ine associations with psychological well-being. The
phenomenon of discontinuity among people with
dementia has not been explored in large-scale stud-
ies, so we do not know how frequent this experience
of disruption is, or the extent to which it is associ-
ated with psychological well-being for people with
dementia and their family caregivers.
In this study we aimed to explore the extent to
which people with mild-to-moderate dementia expe-
rience a sense of phenomenological discontinuity,
the way in which the experience of those who feel
they are ‘not the same person’ differs from those
who retain a continuous sense of self, and the factors
that are associated with disruption to the ontologi-
cal self for both people with dementia and family
caregivers. We hypothesized that the subjective psy-
chological experience of discontinuity: 1) would be
more frequent among those with more awareness or
acknowledgement of their condition or specific diffi-
culties; 2) would not be clearly linked to demographic
or dementia-related characteristics; and 3) would be
related to poorer psychological well-being, indicated
by poorer scores on a range of psychological indica-
tors as well as measures of ability to ‘live well’ with
the condition. If so, it might be a useful predictor of
declining ability to ‘live well’ with the condition and
a means of identifying individuals who would bene-
fit particularly from additional support in adjusting to
life with dementia or targeted interventions to address
specific needs.
METHODS
Design
We analyzed data from the baseline assessment
wave (Time 1, T1) of the Improving the experience
of Dementia and Enhancing Active Life (IDEAL)
longitudinal cohort study; for protocols see [22, 23].
The analyses were based on v.4 of the IDEAL T1
dataset. IDEAL was approved by Wales Research
Ethics Committee 5 (reference 13/WA/0405) and the
Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, Ban-
gor University (reference 2014 11684). IDEAL is
registered with the UK Clinical Research Network
(UKCRN), number 16593.
Participants
IDEAL participants were recruited through UK
National Health Service memory services and other
specialist clinics and via the online Join Demen-
tia Research portal between July 2014 and August
2016. Inclusion criteria were a clinical diagnosis
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of dementia of any type, in the mild-to-moderate
stage as indicated by a Mini-Mental State Exam-
ination (MMSE) [24] score of 15 or above, and
living in the community at the time of recruitment.
Exclusion criteria were inability to provide informed
consent, other terminal illness, and any known risk
for home visits to pose a risk to researchers. The
IDEAL cohort at T1 comprised 1,547 individuals
with dementia, of whom 1,283 had a care partner
(family member or close friend) also participating.
Participants were visited by a researcher on 3 occa-
sions to complete the T1 assessment; people with
dementia completed the questionnaires in an inter-
view with the researcher, while caregivers were given
their questionnaires to complete by themselves while
the researcher was interviewing the person with
dementia.
Measures
Continuity of the ontological self was assessed
with the single item ‘I am still the same person as
I have always been’, using 5 response options from
strongly agree to strongly disagree (0 = strongly dis-
agree, 1 = disagree, 2 = neutral, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly
agree). The question was embedded in the second of
the three interviews conducted at T1, which focused
on psychological health, adjustment to the condition,
and well-being.
Awareness, or acknowledgement of the condition
or specific difficulties, was assessed with the 9-item
screening scale from the Representations and Adjust-
ment to Dementia Index (RADIX) [25]. This was
included to allow an exploration of any possible
association between extent of acknowledgement of
difficulties and sense of discontinuity in the ontolog-
ical self.
We recorded age, sex, educational qualifications,
socio-economic status calculated on the basis of
Office for National Statistics [26] classifications, liv-
ing situation, care partner involvement (whether there
was a participating care partner, and if so whether
this was a spouse/partner or other relative/friend),
dementia diagnosis, and time elapsed since the diag-
nosis was made. Social network size was assessed
with the 6-item Lubben Social Network Scale [27].
The number of co-morbid health conditions present
alongside dementia was assessed with the Charlson
Comorbidity Index [28, 29] and the age-adjusted
score calculated.
Cognition was assessed with the Addenbrooke’s
Cognitive Examination-III [30]. Functional ability
was assessed with the Dependence Scale [31] and
the modified 11-item Functional Activities Question-
naire [32, 33], rated by caregivers where available.
Caregivers completed the Neuropsychiatric Inven-
tory Questionnaire [34, 35], yielding scores for
number of symptoms observed, severity and result-
ing distress. Caregiver stress was assessed with the
Relative Stress Scale [36].
Positive psychological indicators explored were
self-acceptance assessed with the 7-item Self-
Acceptance sub-scale of the Ryff Scales of
Psychological Well-Being [37] as described in the
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing [38], self-
esteem assessed with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale [39], self-efficacy assessed with the Gener-
alized Self-Efficacy Scale [40], attitudes towards
own ageing assessed with the Attitude Toward Own
Aging sub-scale of the Philadelphia Geriatric Cen-
ter Morale Scale [41], and optimism assessed with
the six non-filler items from the Life Orientation
Test-Revised [42]. Negative psychological indicators
explored were loneliness assessed with the short ver-
sion of the De Jong Gierveld Loneliness Scale [43]
and depression assessed with the 10-item Geriatric
Depression Scale [44].
Ability to ‘live well’ with dementia was assessed
with the Quality of Life in Alzheimer’s Disease
Scale [45], World Health Organization-Five Well-
Being Index [46], and Satisfaction with Life Scale
[47].
Statistical analysis
Responses to the continuity question were recoded
to form a binary variable. Strongly agree, agree,
and neutral responses were combined into a ‘con-
tinuity’ category and strongly disagree and disagree
responses were combined into a ‘discontinuity’ cat-
egory.
Analysis of variance and chi-squared tests were
used to compare the two groups (discontinuity versus
continuity) on demographic characteristics and other
variables. Because the large sample size could result
in small differences being statistically significant, we
calculated eta-squared (η²) effect sizes for signifi-
cant comparisons, which were interpreted as follows:
small = 0.01; moderate = 0.06; and large = 0.14 [48].
To correct for multiple comparisons, we applied
the Holm-Bonferroni correction; only findings that
remained significant after correction are reported as
such, with associated effect sizes.
L. Clare et al. / Continuity of Self In People with Dementia 131
RESULTS
Responses to the continuity question were avail-
able for 1,465 participants; the majority agreed (859,
59%) or strongly agreed (199, 14%) that they were
still the same person, 95 (6%) were neutral, 282
(19%) disagreed, and 30 (2%) strongly disagreed.
Recoding this to a binary variable, 1,153 (79%)
agreed or were neutral (continuity group) while 312
(21%) disagreed (discontinuity group). Thus, about
1 in 5 of the sample described an experience of dis-
continuity in the ontological self.
On the RADIX screening questions, 103 of the
1,465 participants answered ‘no’ to all 9 items, indi-
cating that they did not acknowledge any specific
difficulties or changes related to dementia. Of these,
97 (94%) were in the continuity group and only 6
(6%) were in the discontinuity group. Two of those 6
were considered by the interviewer to have acknowl-
edged some dementia-related difficulties at other
points during the interview. Thus, the proportion of
people in the discontinuity group was lower among
those not acknowledging dementia-related changes
or difficulties.
Characteristics of participants in the two groups
are summarized in Table 1. The average age of
participants in the discontinuity group was slightly
younger; the difference was statistically significant,
but the effect size was negligible. There were no
differences between the groups in respect of sex, edu-
cational qualifications, socio-economic status, living
situation, care partner involvement, social network
size, dementia sub-type, time since diagnosis, or
age-adjusted number of co-morbid health conditions.
Given the lack of differences between the groups
we did not control for age or other characteristics
in subsequent analyses.
Comparisons of cognitive and functional ability
and neuropsychiatric symptoms are shown in Table 2.
There were no differences between the two groups in
cognitive test scores or in care partner ratings of func-
tional ability and dependence. Caregivers of people
in the discontinuity group reported a slightly higher
number of neuropsychiatric symptoms; this differ-
ence was significant, but the effect size was small.
Taken together, these findings generally support the
hypothesis that discontinuity is not clearly linked to
participant or dementia-related characteristics.
Psychological indicators and measures of ‘living
well’ are summarized in Table 3. These measures
did differentiate between the two groups. The dis-
continuity group had significantly lower scores for
self-acceptance, self-esteem, self-efficacy, attitudes
towards own aging, and optimism, with moderate
or small-to-moderate effect sizes, and significantly
higher scores for loneliness and depression, with
small-to-moderate effect sizes. The same pattern was
observed for measures of ‘living well’. The disconti-
nuity group had significantly lower scores for quality
of life, well-being and satisfaction with life, with
small-to-moderate effect sizes. These findings sup-
ported the hypothesis that discontinuity would be
associated with poorer psychological well-being and
reduced ability to ‘live well’ with the condition.
There was some indication that caregivers of peo-
ple in the discontinuity group fared worse than
caregivers of people in the continuity group (see
Table 2). They reported significantly greater distress
at the neuropsychiatric symptoms they observed and
higher levels of caregiver stress, but with small effect
sizes.
DISCUSSION
This is the first large-scale study to explore the
experience of phenomenological continuity and dis-
continuity in the ontological self, and the associations
with other variables, among people with mild-to-
moderate dementia. Participants in the IDEAL cohort
were asked whether they felt they were ‘still the same
person’ that they ‘have always been’. The 21% who
disagreed with this statement, indicating a sense of
discontinuity in the subjective sense of self, experi-
enced significantly poorer psychological well-being
across a range of indicators, and had significantly
lower scores on measures of ‘living well’ with demen-
tia, than their counterparts who reported retaining a
subjective sense of continuity, and almost all showed
at least some awareness of the condition or associated
changes or difficulties. There was no clear association
with demographic or disease-related characteristics,
but some indication of increased levels of stress in
caregivers.
Discontinuity was less frequent in our sample than
the 50% reported in the one previous small-scale
study of this phenomenon among people with demen-
tia [17]; discontinuity was reported by half of the
participants with Alzheimer’s disease (n = 14) and
half of the age-matched healthy controls (n = 25).
Given that the group of people with dementia in this
earlier study both included participants with more
extensive cognitive impairments (MMSE score of
10 and above) and found that those who provided
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Table 1
Comparison of participant characteristics for the discontinuity and continuity groups
Characteristic Discontinuity Continuity Comparison p η2
(n = 312) (n = 1153)
Age Mean 74.72 76.60 F(1,1463) = 12.02 0.001 0.008
SD 9.07 8.35
N 312 1153
Sex Male 188 638 χ2(1) = 2.42 0.120 0.041
Female 124 515
Educational qualifications No qualifications 70 325 χ2(3) = 5.77 0.123 0.064
School leaving cert age 16 50 206
School leaving cert age 18 114 379
University 69 218
Missing 9 25
Socioeconomic status I Professional 31 93 χ2(6) = 10.00 0.124 0.085
II Managerial and technical 122 375
III-NM Skilled non-manual 55 228
III-M Skilled manual 50 248
IV Unskilled 27 109
V Unskilled 6 26
Armed forces 2 17
Not applicable/missing 19 57
Living situation Alone 51 215 χ2(2) = 1.82 0.403 0.035
With spouse/partner 247 867
With others 14 65
Unknown 0 6
Care partner participation Spouse/partner 214 780 χ2(2) = 0.70 0.705 0.022
Other relative/friend 44 184
No care partner participating 54 189
Lubben Social Network
Scale score
Mean 14.22 15.28 F(1,1396) = 6.80 0.009 0.005
SD 6.06 6.19
N 294 1104
Dementia diagnosis Alzheimer’s (AD) 166 647 χ2(6) = 9.34 0.155 0.080
Vascular (VaD) 31 128
Mixed AD and VaD 62 249
Frontotemporal 12 40
Parkinson’s disease 13 30
Lewy body 16 33
Unspecified/Other 12 26
Time since diagnosis <1 year 157 618 χ2(3) = 1.48 0.687 0.033
1–2 years 96 330
3–5 years 32 110
6 + years 3 17
missing 24 78
Charlson Comorbidity
Index age-adjusted score
Mean 7.03 6.98 F(1,1372) = 0.10 0.752 0.000
SD 2.12 2.22
N 295 1079
Note: Bold indicates significant at the 5% level after Holm–Bonferroni correction.
more sophisticated explanations for their response to
the continuity question were more likely to report a
subjective sense of discontinuity, one might perhaps
have expected to see higher levels of discontinu-
ity in the present sample. However, Troll and Skaff
[16] reported that almost all of their ‘oldest old’ par-
ticipants considered they were essentially the same
person as they were in their 20s. In general, research
from a lifespan developmental perspective indicates
that self-continuity increases over the lifespan, with
older people experiencing a well-defined and stable
sense of self whereas young adults are still engaged
in developing their identity [13]. Therefore, the find-
ings of the present study could be considered more in
line with existing evidence.
A possible explanation might be the difference in
the wording of the question, as the question used in
the earlier study required a direct comparison to a
specific earlier life-stage (the 20s) whereas in our
study the question was phrased more generally as the
‘same person you have always been’. Asking for a
direct comparison with a past life-stage might lead
L. Clare et al. / Continuity of Self In People with Dementia 133
Table 2
Comparison of cognition, functional ability, neuropsychiatric symptoms and caregiver stress in the discontinuity and continuity groups
Measure Discontinuity Continuity Comparison p η2
(n = 312) (n = 1153)
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive
Examination-III score
Mean 69.47 69.68 F(1,1368) = 0.06 0.804 0.000
SD 13.80 12.89
N 293 1077
Functional Activities Questionnaire
rated by caregiver
Mean 18.25 17.55 F(1,1135) = 1.25 0.264 0.001
SD 8.11 8.68
N 239 898
Dependence Scale rated by caregiver Mean 5.80 5.56 F(1,1143) = 1.72 0.191 0.001
SD 2.63 2.58
N 235 910
Neuropsychiatric Inventory
Questionnaire number of symptoms
reported by caregiver
Mean 4.07 3.42 F(1,1158) = 13.25 <0.001 0.011
SD 2.54 2.43
N 245 915
Neuropsychiatric Inventory
Questionnaire severity of symptoms
reported by caregiver
Mean 7.24 6.41 F(1,973) = 5.43 0.020 0.006
SD 4.87 4.57
N 217 758
Neuropsychiatric Inventory
Questionnaire distress at symptoms
reported
Mean 8.66 6.73 F(1,868) = 14.55 <0.001 0.016
SD 7.12 5.95
N 197 673
Relative Stress Scale Mean 21.02 18.56 F(1,1148) = 12.06 0.001 0.010
SD 9.86 9.70
N 239 911
Note: Bold indicates significant at the 5% level after Holm–Bonferroni correction.
Table 3
Comparison of psychological indicators and measures of ‘living well’ in the discontinuity and continuity groups
Measure Discontinuity Continuity Comparison p η2
(n = 312) (n = 1153)
Ryff Self-Acceptance Sub-scale (7 item) Mean 29.31 32.69 F(1,1301) = 75.57 <0.001 0.055
SD 6.67 5.48
N 277 1026
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale Mean 27.70 29.96 F(1,1347) = 84.86 <0.001 0.059
SD 4.07 3.55
N 282 1067
Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale Mean 27.04 29.86 F(1,1365) = 61.40 <0.001 0.043
SD 5.85 5.23
N 279 1088
Philadelphia Geriatric Center Morale
Scale Attitudes toward own Ageing
Mean 1.84 2.70 F(1,1156) = 52.97 <0.001 0.044
SD 1.59 1.64
N 241 917
Life Orientation Test Mean 13.85 15.27 F(1,1429) = 40.25 <0.001 0.027
SD 3.82 3.34
N 302 1129
De Jong-Gierveld Loneliness Scale Mean 1.87 1.23 F(1,1437) = 44.23 <0.001 0.030
SD 1.72 1.41
N 301 1138
Geriatric Depression Scale (10 item) Mean 3.55 2.44 F(1,1317) = 51.37 <0.001 0.038
SD 2.57 2.17
N 260 1059
Quality of Life in Alzheimer’s Disease Mean 34.35 37.40 F(1,1336) = 60.36 <0.001 0.043
SD 6.17 5.70
N 274 1064
World Health Organization-Five
Well-Being Index Well-Being Index
Mean 51.55 63.47 F(1,1445) = 84.06 <0.001 0.055
SD 22.48 19.45
N 303 1144
Satisfaction with Life Scale Mean 22.92 26.94 F(1,1435) = 113.06 <0.001 0.073
SD 6.72 5.62
N 306 1131
Note: Bold indicates significant at the 5% level after Holm–Bonferroni correction.
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participants to focus more on differences between
their past and present selves, whereas the more gen-
eral wording might be more likely to predispose
participants to consider similarities. For people with
dementia, the more generally-worded question invit-
ing comparison with the ‘person you have always
been’ may be more likely to invite comparison with
the pre-dementia self in the relatively recent past, and
hence provide a more representative estimate of the
extent to which people experience a sense of disconti-
nuity as they develop and live with mild-to-moderate
dementia. Further research could explore the issues
associated with the question used in our study and
the version used by Tippett and colleagues [17] in
more detail in order to provide a clearer picture of
the phenomenon elicited and allow for comparisons
between people with dementia and older people with-
out dementia.
Those individuals who acknowledge and openly
discuss their diagnosis of dementia could perhaps be
asked more directly about perceived differences to the
pre-dementia self. In IDEAL, we phrased the ques-
tion in general terms because some participants in this
large survey might not acknowledge, or be aware of,
their diagnosis and/or any associated difficulties. In
the present study, 7% of participants responded nega-
tively to a series of screening questions asking about
perceived difficulties, symptoms, and changes [25],
intended to identify those who did not acknowledge,
or who lacked awareness of, the condition. Almost
all of these participants also felt themselves to be
the ‘same person’ they had always been. An apparent
lack of awareness might arise for a number of reasons,
with responses influenced by perceptions of socially
appropriate answers, psychological mechanisms of
avoidance, or neurologically-based anosognosia [49].
However, it seems plausible to expect that partici-
pants who perceived no dementia-related changes or
difficulties might also be less likely to report a sense
of discontinuity, and our findings support this view.
The finding that the subjective sense of discontinu-
ity was associated with poorer psychological health
while not reflecting demographic or disease-related
differences points to its validity as an indicator of
a potentially important aspect of individuals’ sub-
jective psychological experience. Associations were
seen in relation to self-evaluative judgements regard-
ing self-acceptance, self-esteem and self-efficacy,
and attitudes towards own aging, as well as extend-
ing more generally to mood, optimism and loneliness.
This in turn was reflected in lower levels of quality
of life, well-being and satisfaction with life. While
a myriad of factors show small associations with the
quality of life of people with dementia [50], statistical
modelling of IDEAL cohort data has demonstrated
the key role of psychological characteristics and
health in shaping individual evaluations of quality
of life, well-being and satisfaction with life [51]. As
those who report a subjective sense of discontinu-
ity are likely to be experiencing lower psychological
well-being and/or more psychological distress, iden-
tifying these individuals may offer a relatively simple
means of focusing on those who would benefit from
additional support.
Caregivers of participants reporting a subjective
sense of discontinuity had slightly increased levels
of stress. Again, multiple factors may influence the
experience of family caregivers [1, 52], and study of
reciprocal influences within the caregiving dyad is
at a relatively early stage. However, previous actor-
partner independence modelling of IDEAL cohort
data demonstrated that depression in the person with
dementia was associated with reduced quality of life,
well-being and satisfaction with life in the care part-
ner [53], while perceived relationship quality had no
such effect [54]. Thus, the psychological health of
both members of the dyad may be interrelated, with
poor psychological health in the person with demen-
tia contributing to greater stress in the carer, and vice
versa. Addressing the psychological needs of one
member of the dyad may also improve well-being
for the other.
Our approach of investigating the experience of
continuity or discontinuity in a cohort of people
with mild-to-moderate dementia has a number of
strengths, including the large sample size, inclusion
of people with a range of dementia sub-types and
other characteristics, and availability of data from an
extensive set of measures. However, there are some
limitations that must be considered.
The most important of these, also comprehen-
sively discussed by Tippett and colleagues [17],
relates to the way in which respondents understand
and interpret the question used to assess disconti-
nuity. Even though these types of question appear
to directly address the issue, it is difficult to know
whether someone who reports a sense of disconti-
nuity really experiences him- or herself subjectively
as a fundamentally different person or whether the
response reflects a considered, analytical attempt to
engage with the implications that cognitive decline
and dementia may hold for sense of self. This reflects
the key challenge inherent in attempting to elicit and
measure the subjective experience of self as opposed
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to elements of self-knowledge that can be more
objectively operationalized and assessed [10]. Nev-
ertheless, our observation that participants who did
not acknowledge dementia-related difficulties were
extremely unlikely to report a sense of discontinu-
ity supports the view that the question asked in the
present study is relevant and potentially useful in this
context. In this analysis we did not consider the pos-
sible implications of differing degrees of certainty
in responding, as numbers in the ‘strongly disagree’
category in particular were small. We were not able
to compare the responses of our participants with
dementia to those of other groups and hence can-
not determine the extent to which the profile elicited
is specific to people living with dementia. Similarly,
there might be generational or cultural differences in
how people respond to questions about continuity of
self, but as our sample, recruited through health ser-
vices in 29 areas of Great Britain, consisted largely
of individuals from a white British background, we
were not able to explore this possibility. Further
research could compare responses among those with
and without dementia and among different groups
of people living with dementia, and assess the util-
ity of other methods of exploring this phenomenon.
Another issue to acknowledge is that while the ques-
tion was asked only once at this time-point, subjective
perceptions of self might be influenced in the moment
by a range of factors and hence responses could poten-
tially change over relatively short periods of time
and in different contexts. Finally, the cross-sectional
nature of our study allows only for the observation of
associations; however, as longitudinal data from the
IDEAL cohort become available, we will be able to
explore both the predictive value of the experience of
discontinuity and the stability of responses over time.
In view of the association with poorer well-being,
the question arises as to whether a subjective sense of
discontinuity might be reduced or changed through
intervention. There is relatively little evidence avail-
able regarding the potential of interventions to
support self and identity in people with dementia [55].
Supporting identity is sometimes considered either
as a specific aim of an intervention or as a possible
outcome, but without measuring identity or objec-
tively assessing the impact the intervention has on
identity alongside other possible benefits. Examples
of such interventions include Selbst-Erhaltungs-
Therapie (self-maintenance therapy) [56], use of
videos composed of personal photographs [57], and
music-based interventions [58]. Only a handful of
interventions both explicitly aim to support identity
and assess this as an outcome; examples include
engagement in activities relevant to personal iden-
tity roles [59] and life review or life story work
[60, 61]. These interventions focus on aspects of
self-knowledge and re-connecting individuals with
elements of their past identities. Further research
might explore the potential to address issues of self
and identity directly through targeted intervention.
While theoretical and methodological questions
remain to be answered, our findings have one key
practical implication. In busy clinical settings where
extensive assessment of psychological well-being is
impractical, a sensitive exploration of whether the
person is experiencing a sense of discontinuity of
self, perhaps by weaving a question like ‘Do you
feel as if you are the same person you have always
been?’ into the conversation, offers a potential means
of identifying individuals who may be at increased
risk of poor psychological well-being and who may
benefit from additional services or support, both for
themselves and for any family member providing
care. This should, of course, be done with caution
and sensitivity, and only in situations where the topic
can be properly considered, any emotional response
explored satisfactorily, and any necessary follow-up
provided.
Conclusions
This study represents the first large-scale explo-
ration of discontinuity in subjective sense of self
among people with mild-to-moderate dementia. It
has shown that a significant proportion of people
with mild-to-moderate dementia describe a subjec-
tive experience of discontinuity, and that this is
associated with poorer psychological health and
reduced ability to ‘live well’ with the condition, as
well as slightly increased levels of stress in fam-
ily caregivers. Further investigation may provide
greater clarity about the phenomenon and its implica-
tions, and the potential for intervention. Meanwhile,
sensitively asking individuals with dementia about
the subjective experience of self may provide busy
clinicians and practitioners with a useful means of
identifying individuals who may be at increased risk
of poor well-being and who may benefit from addi-
tional support.
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